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Abstract. We present two extensions of the naming conventions of Communicating Sequential 
Proceses [ 111: computed communication targets and unspecified communication targets, as well 
as corresponding extensions to the system of cooperating proofs [3] for verifying distributed 
programs. These language extensions are important for the natural expressibility of many 
distributed programs. Examples of the use of these extensions are discussed and verified. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce two extensions of the CSP process 
naming conventions [l l] together with their associated proof rules. The suggested 
extensions permit a more natural expression of many distributed programs than in 
the CSP original convention. The lack of these features in CSP has been widely 
criricized. The proof rules are presented as an extension of the proof system known 
as cooperating proofs, introduced in [33 and proved to be sound and (relatively) 
complete in [2]. A similar extension could be incorporated also in the proof system 
in [12]. The paper assumes acquaintance with the CSP primitives. The proof system 
of cooperative proofs is briefly reviewed. 
A basic aspect of CSP is its naming conventions, which require that every 
communication command have a farger of communication, i.e., a process that is 
explicitly named in the command and determinable syntactically at compile 
time. Thus, for the language as described in [ 111, a target process must be named 
either by a simple name, as in printer!line, or by an indexed name, as in 
phil[i + 1 mod S]?leftfork( (appearing in phil[i]), in which case the index must 
be a compile time constant. These conventions have been criticized as being very 
restrictive for distributed applications in which the establishment of communication 
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is dynamically determined. A similar restriction applies to Milner’s CCS [ 131, where 
port-names are used for specifying the target of communication, instead of CSP’s 
process names. A syntactically determined port-name must be used in any CCS 
communication command, (see [7]). 
The contribution of this paper is the introduction of the following two extensions 
of the CSP naming conventions: 
(1) Computed targets of communication, and 
(2) Unspecified targets of communications, 
accompanied by appropriate proof-rules which axiomatically define their semantics. 
The focus on CSP rather than on other languages with similar restrictions is justified 
by the existence of fully worked-out proof-system for reasoning about CSP pro- 
grams. 
An informal description of these two extensions follows: 
(1) Computed target of communication. As a typical application where this 
extension is needed we consider routing protocols. Assume that a fixed network 
structure is given. Also assume that in the solution to some problem a process p[i] 
has to send a message m to a process p[j], to which it is not connected in the 
network. On the other hand, p[k] is connected to both p[i] and p[j]. We would 
like to be able to express the simple routing strategy whereby p[i] sends a pair 
(m,j) to p[k] and when p[k] receives the pair, it sends m to p[j]. Here p[k] has 
to communicate with a process whose identity is dynamicaNy determined (in the 
example considered, as a result of a communication). This pattern of communication 
is not simply expressible in CSP. 
As another example, consider programming in CSP a centralized implementation 
of CSP itself. Such an implementation could consist of a scheduler, receiving 
information about the processes’ readiness to communicate. It will determine the 
identities of the next pair to proceed by consulting local tables it maintains, and 
will have to communicate with the chosen pair to let them proceed. 
In the CCS context, the need for a similar extension was referred to by [7], 
where a modeling of UNIX using CCS is suggested. They envision an algebraic, 
rather than proof-theoretic, definition of an extension to CCS. 
(2) Unspecified targel of communication. For this extension, a typical application 
is a service process (e.g., a process implementing a library procedure or a data- 
structure). Several critics of CSP (e.g., [5]) have observed that such a process cannot 
be elegantly coded in CSP. The reason for this inelegance is that the service process 
has to ‘know’ the identities of all potential users, and explicitly refer to them in 
its code. Typical code might look as follows: 
server:: * [user_ l?request( )+ (service- 1) 
Cl 
Cl user-n ?request ( ) + (service-n >I. 
Note that whenever a user of a sewer is added or deleted, the sewer process must 
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be reprogrammed. In addition, it is necessary to have many copies of the (service) 
code. We consider an extension in which the target of a communication is left 
unspecified, and matches a complementary command in any process in the network. 
We define both extensions by means of extending cooperating proofs. The com- 
plexity of these extensions may shed some light on the practicality of adding them 
to any actual implementation of CSP. However, even if one comes to the conclusion 
that such extensions are too expensive or inefficient, they still could play a useful 
role in the verification of various protocols expressed as programs in this extended 
version of CSP. In [14] the verification of a protocol for remote servicing is presented 
which uses these extensions. 
We remain within the framework of [l l] by considering arrays of processes as 
the basic structuring tool. However, the results apply also to other structuring 
methods, i.e., trees of processes. We also retain the constraint that the network 
structure is fixed, i.e., processes are not dynamically created or destroyed. Relieving 
the latter restriction calls for more radical modification of the basic language and 
its proof system, and is considered outside the scope of the current extensions. In 
a more general setting, one would need operators producing process names as 
values, e.g., they could be passed as parameters to procedures; however, we shall 
not consider this generality here, and treat only computed indices to process arrays. 
We, in fact, show that, within the restrictions imposed, these language extensions 
can be simulated within the original CSP, and the required properties are deducible 
from that simulation. One could, of course, argue that such extensions are not 
needed if they can be simulated. Our argument is that it is better to show such a 
simulation only once, in a metatheorem, and program using the extensions, thereby 
avoiding a lot of code copying. A similar justification applies to the usage of while 
or if-then-else, even though they can be simulated using goro. 
The extensions to cooperating proofs also serve as a first approximation to proof 
rules for the ADA [l] rendezvous construct. For such attemtps, see [4, lo], where 
the [3] system serves as a basis for extension to ADA-restricted versions. 
2. Computed communication targets 
2.0. The extension 
In this section we introduce the extension of CSP allowing for a (dynamically) 
computed target of communication. 
Whenever a process is a member of an array of processes p, we refer to it as a 
p-process. We use the following syntax for communication commands: 
pklk fG--l!y 
where e is any expression yielding a value of the index-type of p, and referring 
only to variables local to the process in which the command appears. The intuitive 
meaning of such commands is to input from (or to output to) the process whose 
index is the current value of e. By the disjointness of variable sets of different 
processes, the value of e may not be changed by another process. We shall assume 
that the evaluation of e always terminates. (Furthermore, if e’s value is outside the 
boundary of the array of processes, the whole program fails.) 
2.1. Partial correctness proofs 
To make the paper more self-contained, we briefly review the main features of 
cooperating proofs. The proof system has two levels. In the first level, separate 
proofs are constructed for each process. To obtain, in the second level, a proof for 
the concurrent composition, the separate proofs are shown to cooperate. The 
standard proof rules for guarded commands are used in the separate proofs, and 
in addition, the following IWO i/o axioms: 
(4 {P}a{Q} where (Y is p[i]?x or p[j]!y. 
P and Q are any assertions referring to the local variables of the process in which 
the assertions appear. We assume some fixed first order language rvith equality as 
the assertion language. 
The input axiom may be used to ‘guess’ the input value sent by another process. 
Note that the postcondition Q cannot really be arbitrary since it must pass a 
cooperation test. For a more detailed explanation of the output axiom, the reader 
is referred to [3]. Similar input and output axioms are used also in [12]. As can 
easily be seen, the soundness of these axioms does not depend on the fact that i 
is a compile time constant. We shall also use the same axioms for computed 
communication targets. 
For the cooperation tests, a global inuariant I (possibly referring to variables of 
ulf processes and to auxiliary variables) is introduced. Every process is annotated 
with brackets in such a way that a bracketed section contains at most one communica- 
tion command. The invariant is only required to hold outside bracketed sections. 
Since communication targets are syntactically determined, it is possible to use 
the notion of a syntactic matching between a pair of i/o commands in the original 
formulation of cooperating proofs. The cooperation test has to establish the postcon- 
ditions of the matching sections and the invariant, given that the precondition and 
the invariant hold initially. The invariant is also used to rule out all syntactically 
matching pairs of bracketed sections which do nol semantically match. The basic 
cooperation test is: 
(Cl) {prel A pre2 A I) SI II S2 {Posr, A Post2 * 0 
where {prei} S1 {postl} and {pre2} S2 (posf2) are syntactically matching bracketed 
sections, and the preconditions and postconditions are taken from the corresponding 
separate proofs. 
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In case S1 and S2 do not semantically match, the conjunction of the precondition 
and the invariant will be inconsistent. In [3] additional rules are introduced to 
reduce (Cl) to a sequential proof (not involving concurrency and communication); 
the most important is the communication axiom : 
(CA) ~~~~e~p[jl?~lldil!y Ix = Y) 
provided p[j]?x and q[i]!y are taken from q[i] and p[j], respectively. This axiom 
correctly specifies the effect of such a communication (jointly with the rules govern- 
ing the preservation axiom, which fix the output command as not changing the 
value of the output variable; this may have not been emphasized strongly enough 
in [3]). A substitution also could be used, as this axiom participates only in proof 
of cooperation, where variables of both matching sections are accessible. 
We now extend (Cl) to the case of computed communication targets. 
Definition. (1) Two communication commands of the form p[e]?x and q[e’]!y are 
potentially matching iff they appear in a q-process and p-process, respectively. 
(Hence, p[e]?x and p[e’]!y are always potentially matching.) 
(2) Two bracketed sections {pre ,} S1 {post 1}, { prez} Sz {postz} are potentidly 
matching if the corresponding communication commands are. 
(3) A bracketed section S containing a communication command referring to 
p[e] is proper if S does not affect the value of e. In the sequel, we assume all 
bracketed sections to be proper. 
The notion of potential matching replaces that of syntactic matching. A potential 
match will be an actual match provided the following two conditions hold: 
(a) The sections S1 and SZ are taken from q[i] and p[j], respectively. 
(b) There is a time instant during execution when the controls of q[i] and p[j] 
are about to execute S,, S2, respectively, and the current values of e and e’ are j 
and i, respectively. Since S1, S2 are proper, the values of e, e’ do not change by 
the time the i/o commands are reached. 
As a consequence, we obtain the following extension of the cooperation test (Cl): 
(DCl) {prelhpre2AlAe=jAe ’ = i} S& {post, A pOSt2 A 1) 
whenever S1 and S2 are proper potentially matching bracketed sections taken from 
q[i] and p[j], respectively. The assertions prel, pre2, postl, post2 are as in (Cl). 
Note that when e and e’ are both compile time determined, potential matching 
coincides with syntactic matching, and the rule (DCl) reduces to the original rule 
(Cl). Also, in that case all bracketed sections are trivially proper. 
The new cooperation test involves every pair of potentially matching bracketed 
sections; hence the proof burden may be heavy. However, in many practical cases 
the invariant I will be consistent with only one pair of values for e and e’, and 
most of the cooperation tests will vacuously succeed. 
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2.2. Deadlock freedom proofs 
By a deadlock we mean a situation where every process in the program has 
either terminated or is waiting for a communication; hence, all non-terminated 
processes are blocked. This is similar to the deadlock treated by [15]. Sometimes, 
a stronger notion is discussed where a blocked group of mutually-blocking processes 
exist, while other processes are executing. If the other processes terminate event- 
ually, then the stronger deadlock reduces to the one defined here. If they do not, 
the meaning of the whole program is taken to be that of non-termination anyhow. 
Thus, the stronger notion may fit programs with loosely-coupled processes, which 
do not intend to terminate, e.g., operating systems (this distinction was not stressed 
in [3]). 
As is well known, an orthogonal approach of deadlock-detection (instead of 
proving deadlock-freedom), is also discussed extensively in the literature, but is 
not related to the current approach and suggested extensions. 
To prove that a program is deadlock-free, it is sufficient to identify all blocked 
situations (n-tuples of assertions that hold when a program is in a deadlock state; 
see [3] for a rigorous definition) and show that they are no? consistent with the 
invariant I. The CSP convention of distributed fermination (by which a process may 
exit a loop if all processes referred to by guards with a true Boolean part have 
themselves terminated), causes some situations to be unblocked which would 
otherwise be blocked. To cope with this convention, the propositional variables 
END# are introduced. The value of END$\ will become true whenever p[i] 
exits a loop due to this convention and the termination of q[j]. 
For simplicity of notation, we assume just one array p and the corresponding 
variables END;. Since I may refer to END;, we need an extra cooperation test to 
establish that I holds after loop exit due to the above convention. Consider a 
program section (in process p[i]) of the form 
Let A ~(1,. . . , m} be any set of guard indices, and let C be the set of all process 
indices referred to by aj, i E A. Also, let 
pre(S,A)gpre(S)h A bjA A lbj. 
jsA jvZA 
Then, we have the following second cooperation test: 
Here I[trueIENDj]jec is the assertion obtained from I by substituting true for all 
free occurrences of END; in I corresponding to i E C. Intuitively, this clause states 
that when p[i] exits the loop (modeled by post(S) becoming true) due to termination 
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of all processes referred to in guards indexed by A (modeled by posr(p[j], j E C), 
the invariant is reestablished. 
In order to extend this rule to the context of computed targets, let ej be the 
computed target of ‘Y~ (in S). Let A c (1,. . . , m} and let C c (1,. . . n} be such that 
]C( G \A(. The roles of A and C are as in (C2). Then, we must show 
The meaning of the rule is as above, but we must show that the values of all the 
ei’s are indeed in C. Since C is a finite set, say C = {ii, . . . , i,}, the notation ek E C 
is just a shorthand for V,= L .___. mek = il. 
Next, a theorem stating the condition for freedom of deadlock is presented. As 
mentioned above, in order to show that deadlock is impossible, we must show that 
no blocked situation is consistent with the global invariant. This is the idea of 
Theorem 1 in [3]. With dynamic targets of communication, blocked situations can 
no longer be syntactically determined, since they depend on the run-time values 
of process indices. Hence, in order for an n-tuple of appropriate assertions to be 
blocked, it has to satisfy the following condition (no dynamic matching): 
(NDM) For any pair of assertions qi and qi belonging to potentially matching 
communication commands p[e]?.x, ~[e’]!y taken from (proper) bracketed sections 
S1 (in p[j]) and Sz (in p[i]), respectively, qi A qi 3 (e # i v e’#j) holds. 
Using this modified definition of a blocked situation, we may now restate Theorem 
1 of [3]. 
Theorem 1. Given Q proof of {P} [p[l]]]. . .IIp[n]] {Q} with a gfobul incuriunt I, p 
is deadlock free if, for every blocked situation (PI, . . . , P,), -(Ai=,,, Pi A I) holds. 
The proof burden is clearly heavier for the case of dynamic targets, since more 
situations must be considered as (possibly) blocked. 
2.3. Soundness and (relative) completeness (for a fixed network) 
In order to justify the proof rules for the suggested extension, we show that the 
soundness and (relative) completeness are reducible to the corresponding properties 
for the unextended system, which were proved in [2]. 
As was shown in [8], it is sufficient to consider i/o commands as guards only. 
Consider an input command serving as a guard in p[e]?x +S (a similar argument 
applies for output guards). In order to simulate this command, we rely on the fact 
that the network structure is fixed. Assume that p is declared with index bounds 
1 . . . np. We replace the input-guarded command by the guarded selection command 
shown below: 
•i e =k;p[k]?x+S 
k = l....,np 
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(note that k is a bound variable). In other words, since e may vary over a finite 
range only, we replace the computed target by a nondeterministic hoice of every 
element in this range, provided it is the current value of e. If the value of e is not 
in range, all the equalities e = k are false and the whole construct fails. If the 
original command contains a Boolean part 6, it is repeated in every branch in the 
simulating nondeterministic selection. We omit it to simplify the notation. 
In order to prove that the simulation is correct, we bracket the simulating sections 
in a way we call naturally induced. The bracketing of p[e]?x +S is repeated for 
each k in the simulating selection. 
Consider any (fixed) proof {P} S {Q} using an invariant I for S a program using 
the computable target extension. We prove the following: 
Theorem 2. Any two potentially matching bracketed sections satisfy the cooperation 
tests (DCl), (DC2) (with respect to an invariant I and some bracketing) $7 the 
corresponding simulating selections satisfy (Cl), (C2) (with respect to the same 
invariant I and the naturally induced bracketing). 
Proof. Let L1::{prel} S1 {postI} and Lz::(prez} Sz {post*} be two potentially matching 
bracketed sections taken from q[iO] and p[jJ respectively. Let the corresponding 
potentially matching communication commands be p[e]?x +S and q[e’]!y + f, 
respectively. Also, let 
L;::(preI} [ 0 
..k=l..,_, np 






be the corresponding simulating selection. 
(a) (DCI) + (Cl). Suppose Si, S2 satisfy (DCl). Hence 
{pre, hprezhl he =johe’=io}S11]S2 {post1 Apost2AI} (*I 
holds. 
In the two simulating selections, the corresponding branches with k = jo and 
k’ = iO are syntactically matching sections, and (*) reduces to (Cl) for that case. 
(b) (Cl) + (DCl). The branches for k = jO and k’ = iO are syntactically matching 
and satisfy (*) in case (Cl) applies, which implies (DCl) applies for Si, S2. No 
other values for k, k’ may satisfy (*). Note that if none of the equalities e = k (or 
e’= k’) hold, (Cl) will trivially fail for all branches in the selection. In this case, e 
is out of range, and S is indeed semantically invalid. 
Next consider an iteration of the form 
L::{pre} * q bj;aj+Sj 
j= l.....m I 
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After replacing each aj containing a computed target by its simulating selection 
(all embedded in the same loop), we get 
L’::{pre}* [ 0 
j=l.....m; 
bj;e,=ij;(li,+Sj] 
i, = l.....np 
(where the sequential numbering of the lines is according to a lexicographic order). 
Here np is the length of the process array (we again deal with a single array for 
simplicity), ej is the computed target index of aj and ai, results from (Yj by replacing 
ej by ip 
(c) (DC2)+ (C2). Suppose that for some A, C (as above) (DC2) is satisfied by 
L. Define for L’ an index set A’ including indices for these lines of L’ containing 
the Boolean part ii = a for a = ei. Then the set of addressed processes (by members 
of A’) is again C, and clearly L’ satisfies (C2) with respect to A’ and C. 
(d) (C2) + (DC2). Follows directly from the observation that if L’ satisfies (C2) 
with some A and C, A contains at most one occurrence of each ip Cl 
2.4. An example 
We next present a simple example which will serve as an abstraction of more 
complicated routing protocols. In this example, each process p[i], i = 1,. . . , n, 
sends the value of its local variable ai to a process A. The process A, in turn, sends 
(ai, i) to another process B, and B responds by sending the received value back to 
p[i]. That value is received by p[i] in the local variable bi. The task is to show that 
/ji=l,n bi = Ui holds upon termination. We give below the annotated text of the 
program, including all local assertions, and the global invariant. The variables f, g 
and h are auxiliary and are only need for the proof. Note that the second bracketed 
section in B, containing an i/o command with a nonconstant arget, is indeed proper. 
The program, with its pre- and post-conditions, is: 
{true} RECYCLER ::[Allp[i = 1, . . . , nll\Bl[ A bi = Ui)* 
i=l,n 
The individual annotated processes follow. 
* 
q 
k = I . . . ..n 
(p[k]?x +h[k] := l;){h[k] = 1 A ,?, h[il Z 1) 
(B!(x,k);h[k]:= 2;){h[k]=2}]{true} 
p[i]::{gi = O}[(A!ui + gi := l;){gi = 1) 
(B?bi; gi := 2){gi = 2 A bi = ui}] {bi = ui} 
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B : :{f = O} 
*[{f=O}(A?(y, id)+f:= l;){f= 1) 
(p[idl!y;f := O){f= O}]{rrue}. 






The role of the invariant Z in this program is to encode the route that message 
ai follows, and is typical of such protocols. For example, h[i] = 1 implies that the 
communication between p[i] and A has already taken place. 
We next present, in some detail, one of the cooperation tests (DCl). The only 
case that does not reduce to (Cl) is the cooperation between the second bracketed 
sections of B and the second bracketed section in some (potentially matching) 
p-process, say p[iO]. We must show that (after substituting the appropriate pre- 
and post-conditions): 
B?bi,,; gi,, := 2llp[id]!y; f := 0 
{gi(, = 2 A 64, = Ui<, Af = 0 A Z}. 
We use a justification which can easily be transformed into a fully formal proof 
using the rule of formation and the communication axiom given in [3] and the 
standard rules for sequential programs. 
(a) The post conditions f = 0 and gi, = 2 are established directly by local assign- 
ments. To derive bi, = ai,, we reason as follows: from id = io, f = I and Z(2) in the 
precondition, we derive y = aio, and bi, = y follows from the communication axiom. 
(b) Next, we derive the three clauses of the invariant: 
Z(1). For i = iO, we derive h[iJ = 2 in the precondition (usingf = 1 A Z(2) A id = i,J, 
and h[i,] is not affected in the considered program sections; hence, Z(1) holds 
vacuously for i = iO. For i # iO, Z(1) was true in the precondition, and none of the 
gi’s (other than gi,) changed, as well as x did not change, so Z(1) holds again. 
Z(2). Holds vacuously, since f = 0 was already shown to hold. 
Z(3). Holds, since f = 0 was shown. 
Note that for all the ‘wrong’ p[i]‘s, the precondition of the cooperation test will 
yield a contradiction. 
Next, we show part of the proof that the RECYCLER program is deadlock-free. 
We shall examine a blocked situation in which the bracketed section containing 
the communication with a computed target is involved. 
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One such blocked situation is the following: Assume A has terminated, B is 
waiting to execute p[id]!y, p[id] is in its initial state (i.e., waiting to execute A!ai), 
and for i # id, p[i] has also terminated. We shall show that this situation is impossible. 
The n-tuple of assertion of which such a situation constitutes, contains: 
(1) A bi=ai (podA)) 
i=l.n 
(2) gid = 0 (Poe) 
(3) bi = ai, i # id (post(p[i]), i f id) 
(4) f=l (pre((p[id]!y;f := 0) in B) 
The condition (NDM) is satisfied by assumption. 
We now consider the conjunction of the invariant I and all the above assertions, 
and derive a contradiction. The contradiction is immediate, since f = 1 A I implies 
gid = 1 (clause Z(2)), contradicting assertion (2) above. 
Hence, the above described blocked situation cannot occur. Other blocked 
situations are treated similarly, and the whole program is deadlock-free. 
A proof of a more complicated protocol, based on similar ideas, may be found 
in [14]. 
3. Unspecified target for communication 
This section describes another extension of CSP’s process naming convention: 
the unspecified target of communication. The purpose of this extension is to permit 
communication between one process, say p, and any other process that might wish 
to communicate with p, without forcing p ‘to be aware’ of the identities of the 
other processes. As mentioned in the introduction, a typical application for this 
extension is the service process which may communicate with any process in the 
system that needs the particular service it provides. The following notation will be 
used: 
?x: Receive a message (of the type of x) from any process ready to send one to 
the process containing the command. Assign the contents of the message to 
X. 
!y: Send the value of y to any process ready to receive a message (of the type 
of y) from the process containing the command. 
Note that after such a communication has taken place, the process containing the 
command may not ‘know’ the identity of the process with which it has communicated 
(compare with [6], where a built-in function provides this information). This is 
similar to what happens in the ADA entry cull [l], where the process containing 
an entry does not ‘know’ the identity of the caller during the rendezvous. However, 
information can be passed to the caller by means of the call parameters. In case 
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the identity is needed for a follow-up communication with the same furger, it must 
be included with the message. In [16], this problem is called the ‘returned call’ 
problem. Thus, a typical service process will have the form shown below: 
server: : * [?(request, id) + (service )( id 1; id !resuft 1. 
This is the pattern of communication known also as remote procedure call. 
The (informal) meaning of the distributed termination convention in this context 
(as a natural extension to that of CSP) is as follows: An occurrence of ?x or !y in 
a guard is considered false iff all processes containing a complementary command 
addressing the first process have terminated. We prefer instead the extension of 
CSP’s distributed termination convention suggested in [9] where a loop is terminated 
once a predefined subset or processes addressed in the loop guards have all 
terminated. Thus, it is not necessary for all processes addressed by loop guards to 
have terminated in order for a loop to terminate. The reason for this generalization 
is to avoid the situation in which a program containing two (or more) service 
processes neuer terminates, since each service process will wait for all the others 
to terminate, including the other service processes. 
Potential matching is now defined as follows: 
Definition. ?x (or !y) appearing in a process p[i], potentially matches any process 
having the complementary command addressing a p-process, i.e., p[e]!u (p[e]?v) 
or !u (?u). 
For this notion of potential matching, we get the following extension 
cooperation test: 
of the first 
(UCl) (a) {prel A pre2 A I A e’ = i} S&S2 (post1 A post2 A I} whenever S, and SZ are 
potentially matching bracketed sections in different processes, S1 is taken from p[i] 
and contains ?x (!y ), and SZ contains p[e’]!u (p[e’]?v ). 
(b) Same as (Cl) (the original rule) whenever S1 contains ?x and S2 contains !y. 
With this cooperation test, the burden of proof is even heavier than in the case 
of the computed target, since matching can occur with any process-not just those 
within the boundaries of a given array of processes. 
The second cooperation test (UC2) for loop exit due to distributed termination 
is clear and therefore omitted. Both tests are justified with the obvious simulation 
of ?x+S by 
[procI?x +S 
cl 
proc,?x + S 
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where proc 1, . . . , proc, is the list of all other processes in the system. This simulation 
again depends heavily on the assumption of a fixed network. 
From a programming language design point of view, the definition given might 
be too liberal, in that ?x and !y will always match, and may cause programming 
errors of unintended communications. One could impose a restriction that at most 
one partner in a communication will have an unspecified target. We could not find 
any useful examples which would be inexpressible using the more restricted match- 
ing-rule. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented a natural generalization of the process naming 
conventions in CSP. We allow for the target process of a communication to be 
either explictly named, but use dynamically determined names, or be left 
unspecified. These extensions, though being expressible within CSP in the case of 
a fixed network, allow many distributed algorithms to be more naturally expressed 
due to a higher flexibility in target determination ability. 
The semantics of the extension was given as an extension to cooperative proofs, 
a proof system for partial correctness assertions (and freedom of deadlock) for CSP. 
One can derive a straightforward implementation, inspired by the proof rules 
and the simulation without CSP. The overhead would be the one caused by having 
to consider all potentially matching i/o commands, basically treating every com- 
munication network as if it were a full graph. Thus, the space for tables built by a 
compiler becomes larger, as well as the polling time typical to several implementa- 
tions. Obviously, standard data flow techniques (suitably extended to CSP) could 
be used to restrict the values of expressions, thereby minimizing the size of the 
process tables. It seems that the area of compiler optimization for concurrent 
languages till presents several interesting problems. 
More work is needed in extending the naming convention to a setup with dynamic 
process creation and destruction. 
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